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Introduction
Latin American foreign policies were for long shaped by the leadership 
of the United States and the needs of its economic and security 
agendas. Together with former communist states, Latin America lived 
at the center of the neoliberal revolution. For most of the continent 
neoliberal policies were carried out through the acceptance of trade-led 
regionalism and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Foreign 
policy was made to fit economic strategies. The transition was far from 
smooth with hiccups here and there. But as soon as the new century 
opened, important loci of resistance gathered momentum. The fall 
of President Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina in December 2001 is 
the iconic moment of this backlash against politics and politicians 
associated with the failures of neoliberal adjustment policies, 
encapsulated in the chant, “Que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno 
solo” (Arditti, 2008: 57). The Guerra del Agua in Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
Reshaping Regionalism and Regional Cooperation in South America
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 3
9
110
 in 2000, the resistance to the construction of the new international 
airport of Mexico City in 2002 or the Guerra del Gas in Bolivia in 2002-
2003 are part of the long etcetera of cases like these that turned the 
tide (Hershberg and Rosen, 2006). What is noteworthy is that in all of 
them, the resistance to neoliberalism converges with efforts to move 
beyond the liberal framework of participation which had been captured 
by the new left governments ushered in at that point. If in the 1990s, 
the right dictated the parameters of the center, after the 2002 the left 
became the new center. The cognitive shift includes strengthening 
the state to regulate markets and curb the excesses of privatization 
(particularly in the case of water, energy, and communications), 
increasing social expenditures, examining the policy guidelines of 
the IMF with a critical eye and rejecting them when considered 
detrimental, politicizing questions of cultural and ethnical exclusion, 
and experimenting with new participatory channels that deepen the 
liberal format of politics or step outside it. Several governments moved 
to free themselves of direct oversight from the IMF by early repayment 
of loans. In December 2005, Argentina and Brazil announced that 
they would pay off $9.8 billion and $15.5 billion respectively. Uruguay, 
Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela followed suit. In 2006 Ecuador ended 
the operating contract with US oil company, Occidental Petroleum. A 
year later President Rafael Correa ordered the expulsion of the World 
Bank's representative in the country. The rejection of external oversight 
was coupled with social mobilization, a new focus on empowerment of 
indigenous people, and the call to enact solidarity on a regional scale. 
Whatever one’s views, South America became a ready platform for the 
re-ignition of regionalism incorporating the normative dimensions of 
a new era moving beyond (or perhaps around) American-led patterns 
of trade integration. They can only be dismissed as passing because 
everything passes sooner or later.
I argue that alternative institutional structures and cooperation projects 
are, although embryonic, part of a complex set of alternative ideas and 
motivations affecting polities and policies across the region. In what 
ways can we genuinely discern new forms of regional governance at a 
time when trade has ceased to be the all-time glue? What does this post 
trade regime look like? These processes cannot simply be seen as ad hoc 
subregional responses to the string of crises of neoliberalism and the 
step back of the US from the frontline in the hemisphere, but rather, 
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I argue, as visible manifestation of a re-politicization of the region 
giving birth to new polities or regional projects in which states, social 
movements and leaders interact and construct new understandings of 
what the regional space might offer.  My focus is on South America 
as this is an area where contestation and even counter-hegemonic 
processes of importance have been taking place at the level of the state 
and region. (Escobar 2010: 2). In the first section I bring to the fore the 
changed global scenario that has exponentially amplified the room to 
manoeuvre and allowed distance from the mandates of the Washington 
Consensus. In the second section I describe the variety of initiatives 
that cut across the region. In the subsequent sections I analyse and 
contrast the ALBA initiative and the Union of South American 
Nations. Finally some conclusions are offered. By looking at a set of new 
foundational ideas and institutions, from new continental redefinitions 
under UNASUR and ALBA to re-territorialized management of natural 
resources, defence and currency and payments arrangements, I ask how 
these steps are reshaping regional cooperation and what they mean for 
the way we understand regionalism as expanding away from erstwhile 
trade integration.
1. Commodity Booms and New Partners 
South America grew at a rate of 6 to 7 percent between 2003 and 2008 
when the global crisis erupted. China in particular boosted demand for 
the region’s energy and commodities. In 2010 Brazil displaced France 
and the United Kingdom as the world’s fifth largest economy. In many 
countries the accumulation of reserves during boom years allowed the 
governments to enact countercyclical policies to cushion the impact 
of the global recession. South American countries pride themselves 
on having been “last in, first out,” of the economic downturn. The 
awareness of living in a “golden age” (and the need to capture the 
benefits) has shaken up political alliances as well as undermined the 
foundations of the US - led pan American regionalism of the 1990s. 
South America is characterized by a vast availability of natural 
resources. A net energy exporter, the region can play a relevant role in 
the area of global energy security. Yet all countries cannot guarantee 
adequate energy security. Energy rationing and governance conflicts are 
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commonplace. Hence hydrocarbons policy is often a central component 
of the economic policy. In the 1990s South America adopted the market 
approach to promote regional energy integration.1 In the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, escalating oil prices brought raised awareness 
that the terms were unfavourable to government. Governments and 
state firms began to take on a more central role in the pursuit of energy 
integration; supply security became a pillar of geopolitical policy and 
the ambition of state led integration. 
While a sense of urgency drives governments, the governance of natural 
resources has also been at the root of activism and multiple popular 
protests such as the Guerra del Agua or the Guerra del Gas. The advent 
of left leaning governments in South America in the last decade gave 
environmental and social movements the hope that there would be 
reconsideration of unfavorable contracts signed in the neoliberal 
era with mining, energy and mineral companies. Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador as well as Paraguay (massive provider of hydroelectricity to 
Brazil and Argentina) have renegotiated contracts and in some cases 
nationalized companies as well, taking advantage of the new conjuncture 
opened by the commodity boom. Escalating prices made it possible to 
identify large hydrocarbon resources in the Brazilian continental shelf. 
Traditionally a net energy importer, Brazil should become a substantial 
exporter by 2020.  Brazil’s state-controlled oil company Petrobras, the 
world’s fourth largest corporation (trailing only ExxonMobil, Apple, 
and PetroChina), is a world pioneer on issues of biofuels, alternative 
energy and innovation. Petrobras has embarked on a vast oil exploration 
program. Petrobras, for instance, in 2006 announced the largest profits 
in Latin American business history, at $11.2 billion. Getting natural gas 
from Venezuela to Brazil and converting cars from petrol to natural gas, 
thus freeing up oil for export, is a plan that many covet.
The link between extractive industries and regionalism is also manifest 
in the growing number of bilateral treaties springing between countries 
which, in one way or another, facilitate production, transportation 
and exports. These treaties enable territorial integration with the 
construction of physical infrastructure (roads, bridges and hydro-
ways) that connect production sites with urban centres and sea ports 
from where resources can be exported. Resource-driven integration is 
seen with bilateral mining treaties. These mark a new generation of 
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approaches to integration by encouraging bi-national projects along 
national borders.2 
The key question however is whether leaders can muster the mutual 
trust and commitment to rely on the region to meet electricity needs. 
Argentina in particular is keen to speed up regional energy integration 
in order to take advantage of the potential for bilateral hydroelectric 
projects with Brazil and Paraguay to avoid looming shortages. The 
largest contributions to hydroelectiricy are expected from binational 
works such as Panambí, Corpus and Garabi. There seems to be clear 
interest by the private sector, given the favourable bidding conditions. 
In fact, important national groups in the field of turbine construction 
such as Argentina´s Industrias Metalúrgicas Pescarmona, or cement 
industries such as Brazil´s Odebrecht, associated to Cartellone 
(Argentina), are participating in these bids, offering amounts well 
above the minimum. The Brazilian state owned bank BNDES could 
supply some of the financing.
Venezuela and Colombia also struggle on similar grounds. Despite their 
ideological differences and recurrent political flare-ups in November 24, 
2005, former presidents Chavez and Uribe signed a major agreement for 
a joint natural-gas pipeline project. The 215km pipeline is designed first 
to take natural gas from Colombia to Venezuela’s Paraguana refinery 
complex. It is expected that after seven years, Colombia’s natural 
gas resources will be depleted, at which point the flow of gas will be 
reversed and Venezuelan natural gas will flow to Colombia. Gas is only 
a start. Venezuelan ports are limited to the Atlantic, but Colombia 
borders both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. The pipeline is 
meant to be part of a wider ambition to send oil from Venezuela to 
the Pacific so that it can be transported to Asia. So despite ideological 
conflicts Venezuela has every incentive to cultivate non acrimonious 
relations with Colombia. In fact Copetrol, the Colombian state owned 
company, announced the resumption of oil purchases from PDVSA in 
March 2011. The opening to Asia is absolutely critical for Venezuela. 
The US is the biggest customer for Venezuela’s vast oil exports. But 
the US is also that country’s most despised enemy. If Venezuela can 
create an alternative market for its oil in the rapidly growing economies 
of Asia —particularly China and India— it hopes to free itself from 
dependence on US purchases.
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Progress can hardly be described as successful on these fronts but 
ambitions continue to run high. Barely a year after the 2005 Colombian-
Venezuela agreement, the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela 
jointly announced plans for a massive 8,000km natural gas pipeline 
that would go through the Amazon and the environmentally sensitive 
rainforests of South America’s interior, to transport Venezuelan 
natural gas principally to Argentina and Brazil but also linking Bolivia, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay. Venezuela’s side of the deal was clear—selling 
vast quantities of natural gas to new markets in Argentina and Brazil 
while facilitating increased exports of oil to China, accessing the Pacific 
shipping routes by the deal with Colombia. The grandiosity of the 
project caused it to be nicknamed “Hugo-ducto” at the time. Presently 
shelved given the rougher conditions of the Venezuelan economy, it 
would have encouraged the conversion of automobiles from petrol to 
natural gas in the two big economies, Argentina and Brazil, by making 
available vast quantities of natural gas.3 
In that frenzied context it was the 2005 Summit of the Americas in 
Mar del Plata that actually signaled a turning point. George Bush 
was greeted with street demonstrations and hectoring in the summit 
deliberations. The demise of Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
project symbolically marks the breakdown of the neoliberal hegemonic 
consensus in the region. The way had been paved for a number of 
linked steps in which politics and state instruments had acquired 
a renewed role in shaping regional dynamics. Despite the tensions 
and frequent conflicts on a number of issues, the mounting of fresh 
regional dynamics has seen unprecedented levels of consultation and 
coordination in the absence of the customary external marshal leading 
the pack. The inability of the US to impose its will on all the region 
and push through the FTAA indicated a nascent regional political 
economy, separate from Mexico and Central America resting on a 
number of initiatives, all related to the traction of export demand 
from new partners. These make extractive industries (oil, gas and 
mining) a key economic backbone of regional cooperation. Security 
concerns loom large. A number of countries in the region such as 
Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela and Uruguay increasingly fear 
that the greatest security threat may come from external powers given 
the competition for access to natural resources. The Brazilian armed 
forces presently depict a scenario of a US incursion in the Amazon and 
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the subsequent resistance to such invasion. And in Venezuela, as one 
might predict, a US military intervention has long been identified as a 
main defense threat. The construction of a new regionalism hinges on 
the need to articulate a consensus over such concerns as well as on the 
window of opportunity offered by the rise of new partners. The need 
to find avenues of cooperation over natural resource extraction and to 
ensure the flow of exports to Asia is the immediate background to the 
emergence of one of the new regional integration initiatives, the Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUR). Energy and the commodity 
boom overall inspire a fresh mindset whereby the state is brought in 
to regulate and pursue a different balance between states and markets. 
The new balance of interests has injected a different flavor to 
the regional relations. The hallmark is the emergence of regional 
cooperation dynamics in new areas. Neither trade integration is the 
neither objective nor trade liberalization the main policy. Regionalism 
has gradually changed its focus, shifting from trade liberalization to a 
renewed emphasis on cooperation.  The two main features of regional 
projects are thus the fact that they are political projects: “political” 
since state political actors are the drivers of cross-national cooperation; 
and “projects” because they involve an articulated idea of creating a 
region. In an altered context, content also changes. 
2. Vying for Influence: Nascent Forms of Post-
Hegemonic Region Building 
Projects of regionalism change over time. Between the first attempt, the 
Latin American Free Trade Association in 1960, until the contemporary 
projects there have been radical changes of content and purpose. 
These changes allow us to identify three or even four different waves 
of regionalism (Dabène, 2012; Palestini, 2012) are related to equally 
profound changes of development models. If in the 1960s regional 
projects were embedded first within inward-looking industrialization 
(1950- 1970), then within a neoliberal and export-oriented model 
(1990-2000), and finally, during the last decade within models reaching 
out to the Pacific rim and attracted by the commodity bonanza. How 
do regional projects look in contemporary South America? While 
previous ties are maintained, though experiencing some institutional 
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changes, other projects have been launched on quite different grounds. 
Currently, South American regionalist projects can fall into four 
categories.
•	 Preexisting	projects	driven	to	 increase	 intra-regional	trade	
MERCOSUR and to some extent CAN.
•	 The	Pacific	Alliance	comprised	by	Mexico,	Chile,	Colombia	and	
Peru with an emphasis on global trade 
•	 ALBA,	a	project	led	by	Venezuela	aimed	at	social	and	political	
cooperation through non-market mechanisms (redistribution, 
solidarity) and welfare commitments; composed in South America 
by Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, plus Cuba and Nicaragua in 
Central America.
•	 UNASUR,	a	Brazil-inspired	project	aimed	at	building	cooperation	
on geographical connection, defense, security,financial cooperation, 
health. 
All regional projects are shaped by the ambitions of the different 
models adopted by their member-states with elements of both mutual 
denial and competition (Quiliconi, 2013). The Pacific Alliance is 
driven by strongly export oriented liberal market economies like Chile, 
Peru and Colombia. In the opposite extreme, ALBA is integrated by 
governments aiming at strong state intervention in the economy, 
re-nationalization of key economic sectors. An important common 
feature is that all of them have enhanced the scope of cooperation 
beyond trade and even beyond the economic realm as in the case of 
UNASUR and ALBA. They are also committed to increase both socio-
economic development, as well as autonomy in the region vis-àvis 
great powers, especially US. However, they differ in the mechanisms 
deployed to reach such goals: while MERCOSUR and CAN are legacies 
of trade integration, while the Pacific Alliance opens globally, ALBA 
rests on redistributive and solidarity mechanisms mainly financed 
by Venezuelan oil rents. UNASUR is more encompassing in terms of 
both countries and purposes. Notwithstanding their differences the 
latter two, ALBA and UNASUR can come together as efforts of post-
hegemonic regionalism, emphasizing the discontinuity with the US 
led arrangements in the 1990s. 
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What is post-hegemonic regionalism? Three main features can be 
outlined. Post-hegemonic projects seek to extend the scope of regional 
cooperation beyond trade Accordingly, new areas of regional cooperation 
have substituted trade as the integration area par excellance, like 
security and defense, energy, infrastructure and financial cooperation. 
A second characteristic is the re-politicization of regional cooperation 
in general. In fact, the state is central and regionalism is inserted within 
the new developmetalist agenda (Riggirozzi, 2012b; Serbin, 2012; 
Sanahuja, 2012). Finally, from an international relations perspective 
these initiatives are driven by the conscious search for greater autonomy 
on the international arena and in development policies, particularly 
in respect to the US. 
UNASUR and ALBA reveal different aspects of the processes driving 
post hegemonic regional cooperation. They reflect the political 
alliances that are finding a way through the relative decline of the 
US, the emergence of China as a factor in the world economy. Never 
have the countries of South America reached so broadly beyond the 
hemisphere for commercial and political partners. The United States 
remains by far Latin America’s largest trading partner. But once 
Mexico is factored out, the U.S. role is more limited. Asia—primarily 
but not exclusively China—is Latin America’s second largest partner, 
overtaking the European Union. China has now surpassed the United 
States as the top export destination for Brazil, Chile and Peru; it is the 
second destination for many others.
ALBA reflects the association of mass movements with Venezuela’s 
oil riches. Such mass movement had led to factory occupations in 
Argentina and Venezuela, land occupations in Bolivia, Venezuela and 
Brazil, water and gas conflicts in Bolivia and Peru, massive resistance 
to the FTAA and the election of left-leaning governments throughout 
the region. ALBA reflects these mass pressures—sometimes in 
contradictory ways, but reflects them nonetheless. UNASUR was key 
in offsetting attempts to destabilise democratic order in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, and in mediating in conflicts between Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela. It also adopted a common position to support Argentina’s 
demands of UK compliance with UN resolutions over the Malvinas/
Falkland Islands dispute; cooperation over the earthquake in Haiti; 
condemnation of the coup in Honduras with subsequent diplomatic 
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actions to isolate the illegitimate government in international fora. 
Given the ideological split between more the left leaning and the more 
neoliberal governments this is quite an achievement which points in 
the direction of a nascent political community, not devoid of conflict. 
UNASUR´s immediate and forceful reaction in the face of the police 
forces uprising that jeopardized the government of President Correa 
in early October 2010 showed how closely the countries had come 
together, a reaction that was shared by friends and foes alike. President 
Alan Garcia of Peru closed the shared border as soon as he heard about 
the uprising. Juan Manuel Santos, of Colombia —a country with 
whom Ecuador has not yet resumed diplomatic relations was also 
quick to express his support and both joined their counterparts in the 
presidential summit held in Buenos Aires to consider the uprising as 
a matter of regional relevance. Two weeks later the presidents flew to 
Buenos Aires again for the funeral of Nestor Kirchner. Lula, Chavez, 
Mujica but also Piñera, Santos and Alan Garcia huddled together over 
and above political differences. Despite festering differences, collective 
presidentialism was giving signs of solidarity ready to ensure stability 
at times of uncertainty.
3. Alba: Lucky Handouts from Oil Riches 
The plan for the Bolivarian Alternative for Our America (ALBA to use 
the Spanish acronym) was first announced at the Third Summit of 
the Association of Caribbean States, in 2001. In 2005 it was renamed 
as Bolivarian Alliance, as means of indicating the progress made 
both in number of members and the programs in progress. ALBA 
means “dawn” in Spanish, an allegory that former President Chavez 
of Venezuela constantly alluded to in his rhetoric, as in “the dawn of 
the new era”, a point in time when the region should cease to be the 
servant of “imperialism and national oligarchies”. ALBA drew its initial 
motivations from the widespread resistance of civil society to the FTAA 
that had swept the continent through the 1990s. 
The rapprochement between the social movements that had grouped 
together as the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) and Chávez was 
first made clear at the Third Summit of the Americas in Québec en 
2001. The Venezuelan delegation at that point picked up many of the 
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banners of the Alliance and firmly opposed the commitment to close 
the FTAA by January 2005, widely seen then as a public wink to the 
campaigners. The more formal and full engagement with the HSA 
(Saguier, 2012) occurred after the 2002 thwarted coup attempt against 
him. The outright blessing of President Bush to the coup fuelled the 
anger of many social movements against the long and heavy hand of 
the US. At the same time, Chavez became painfully aware that it was 
necessary to build international legitimacy for his regime. After winning 
the 2004 recall referendum, in which he was able to fetch 58 percent of 
the vote, a new phase of foreign policy was inaugurated with an outward 
push for the construction of strategic alliances as a network of support 
for the Venezuelan revolution. (Tussie 2010). Chávez’s belligerent 
attacks on the United States escalated noticeably as from that point. 
He accused the United States of plotting to kill him, conspiring to 
overthrow him, placing spies inside the state oil company Petroleos de 
Venezuela Sociedad Anonima (PDVSA), planning to invade Venezuela 
and terrorizing the world at large. 
ALBA´s goals were announced publicly in August 2003, at the meeting 
of the Latin American Integration Association very much in line with 
the proposals that the HSA had flagged in its platform Alternativas 
para las Américas4 in December 2002: the need for the extension of 
social and economic rights, a regional financial architecture to include 
a bank and a common currency, agreements to foster food security, 
cooperatives; the protection of property rights over national resources. 
In this context, ALBA was flagged as anti-neoliberal model for regional 
integration of the people, antithetical to the FTAA with its emphasis 
on social issues, solidarity and cooperation for the provision of public 
services. Trying to put in motion a socially-oriented alliance, Venezuela 
transferred massive resources to reach the people with health and 
education missions. 
Cuba and Venezuela were the first to sign the constitutional agreement 
in December 2004, clearly marking the building of a front against the 
United States. The agreement set a framework for cooperation between 
both countries whereby Venezuela would provide preferentially priced 
oil in return for a variety of in-kind resources, including health care 
personnel and education programs. The document used language 
not usually associated with bilateral trade deals. The two countries 
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agreed to work together to eliminate illiteracy. Cuba offered, as part 
of the trade deal, 2,000 university scholarships a year to Venezuelan 
students and the support of more than 15,000 medical professionals 
for medical care.
ALBA´s membership has grown from the original core to Dominica, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda. Bolivia 
formally joined in April 30, 2006 after the election of Evo Morales. In 
January 2007 Daniel Ortega as soon as inaugurated added Nicaragua 
to the grouping. Six months before the coup that ousted President 
Zelaya in 2009, Honduras had also become a member, a move that 
was swiftly reversed by the new government in January 2010. Ecuador 
was somewhat of a latecomer. For some time President Correa claimed 
that being oil exporting country, Ecuador did not actually have much 
to gain. However, in fear of the repercussions of the global financial 
crisis Ecuador changed its five year observer status to full membership,5 
soon after the Fifth Summit of the Americas in early 2009, and on 
the occasion of the setting up of the regional payments system, the 
SUCRE, to which Correa attached great importance.  With the entry 
of Bolivia and Ecuador, from looking north to the Caribbean, ALBA 
was able to spread south, at least for a time. The slowdown of the 
Venezuelan economy, rampant inflation, power rationing, the outburst 
of street violence and a more clouded future after the death of Chavez 
in late 2012 have put a brake on the project, but it mere presence clearly 
inspired the shaping of the Pacific Alliance in 2011 as an offsetting 
economic alliance. 
Membership in ALBA never excluded continued participating in 
whatever trade agreements countries wished. All ALBA countries 
remained part of various integration processes. Moreover, no 
country has broken ties with the United States, despite the constant 
demonization of the United States. Nicaragua, for one, under Daniel 
Ortega is still a part of the Central America Free Trade Agreement- 
Dominican Republic agreement with the US. But in trying to build the 
space for an independent foreign policy members are considerably more 
scrupulous and jealous. They are all keen supporters of the creation of 
a political community, either as expressed in UNASUR or in the wider 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. ALBA’s most 
prominent attraction was the establishment of an energy cooperation 
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agreement on offer to Caribbean countries. Chavez proposed the 
creation of Petrocaribe in late 2005 to enable soft and easy terms for the 
purchase of Venezuelan oil. To trail the oil price, countries are eligible 
to borrow a greater portion of the total cost—from 5% if oil falls below 
US$20 a barrel, to a maximum of 50% if oil prices top $150 a barrel. 
In addition, loans can be repaid over a period of 17 to 25 years at an 
interest rate frozen at 1%. Countries also have the option of state-to-
state barter agreements, paying for petrol with sugar, coffee, bananas, 
milk or services.6 By far, this is the most important mechanism used by 
ALBA7 and its foremost lure. Eighteen countries joined Petrocaribe. Its 
bounties have been copious. According to Corrales (2009) Petrocaribe 
represented an annual subsidy of $1.7 billion and puts Venezuelan aid 
on par with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries such as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. Some estimates suggest that the 
total is as large in real terms as the Marshall Plan after World War II. 
According to the International Monetary Fund, (Altmann, 2009) in 
such countries as Guyana, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, financing from 
Petrocaribe represents 5 or 6 percent of the GDP, a magnitude that 
enables these countries to displace the IMF as sole provider of balance 
of payments support. According to former President Oscar Arias, who 
claimed that Venezuela had daily inflows of US$350 million, the 
amount is 4 to 5 times the support provided by the US8. “Eso le permite 
a su presidente ser muy generoso con mucha gente", a generosity that 
Arias had found hard to refuse. Costa Rica, though not a member of 
ALBA, joined PetroCaribe arguing that finance came without any 
strings attached. It was a central glue of regional cooperation. 
The second lure of ALBA, one that might prove to be more sustainable 
than low priced petrol, has been reaching out to the people. Chavez´s 
innovation was to make social power the centerpiece of foreign policy 
and to spend so much of his budget on it, almost 23% of the country´s 
fiscal resources, amounting to over US$33 billion over the ten-year 
period from 1999 to 2008. Venezuela’s social spending abroad opened 
to a diverse portfolio of projects that include education and basic 
health services, medical equipment donations to Nicaragua; heating 
oil subsidies to more than 1 million U.S. consumers; $20 million to 
Haiti for investments in education, health care and housing. Operacion 
Milagros provided free eye surgery in a host of countries. In Bolivia 
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alone 500,000 operations were carried out. This has been an important 
step to reach the hearts and minds of the people, showcasing the aim 
of fighting poverty and social exclusion above those of expanded free 
trade and commerce. Few other countries have utilized ” social power” 
(Corrales, 2009) to the same degree.
ALBA has also laid out a number of stepping stones to attract the 
support of prominent intellectuals in the regional critical tradition. 
To counter the power of the media conglomerates ALBA promoted 
a public telecommunications network, TELESUR, that broadcasts 
throughout the region and also produces programmes and that are sold 
to other networks. The news agenda is led by a board of directors with 
the aid of an advisory council composed of leading Latin American 
intellectuals and activists, such as Nobel Prize-winning human rights 
activist Adolfo Perez Esquivel and Eduardo Galeano, author of The 
Open Veins of Latin America, an emblematic book that Chavez 
flamboyantly handed out to Obama at the Fifth Summit of the 
Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in 2009. The network carries no 
commercial advertising. Currently Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and Venezuela, as well as Argentina and Uruguay (not full ALBA 
members) participate in the project putting out a 24-hour mix of news, 
documentaries and films. Most of the money for Telesur still comes 
from Venezuela. But the governments of Argentina, Uruguay and 
Cuba are also backing it. Talks with Brazil are stalled, partly because 
the government has been trying to get its own continental TV project 
off the ground and going. 
Lying somewhere in between these two types of incentives reaching out 
generously to both minds and pockets are the so-called “grannacional” 
projects. These are intergovernmental initiatives to improve education, 
tourism, and the provision of medical services, much along the lines of 
the Misiones projects in Venezuela. In these areas, Cuban know-how 
has been put to use and the projects have offered basic educational 
skills and primary health services to low-income populations. In 
addition, grannacional companies aim to promote state owned 
multinationals for the production, sale, and distribution of goods. 
Major projects cover the areas of finance, education, infrastructure, 
science and technology, food, energy, environment, health, mining, fair 
trade, tourism, industry, culture, and communications. The Banco de 
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ALBA was set up in 2009 among Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua with an 
initial subscription of US 1.35 bn. The primary purpose of the Bank 
had been to finance the grannacional projects in the pipeline. But the 
Bank came to a virtual standstill when the president, Rafael Isea, fled 
to Miami after severe corruption charges that came into the open soon 
in the aftermath of Chavez´s death.9 
All these steps had reaped rewards for some time. While Chavez 
brought together countries on a political and ideological alliance, ALBA 
became a force to be reckoned with. The non-ratification of the final 
declaration of the Fifth Summit of the Americas in April 2009 illustrates 
the point. ALBA members at the time (Venezuela, Cuba, Dominica, 
Honduras, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent – Grenadines) refused 
to sign the final statement. Ecuador (not a member at the time) and 
Paraguay also added their opposition to the declaration. They argued 
that the document was far from satisfactory because it did not offer 
adequate responses to the international financial crisis and because 
of the “unjustified exclusion” of Cuba from the Summit. In fact, 
ALBA may have represented one of Cuba’s greatest triumphs. Cuba 
has clearly emerged as a symbol of Washington´s imperial disdain. An 
indication of these changed times is the high profile that Cuba attained 
in both the Summit of the Americas in 2009 and 2012 most countries 
then demanding the inclusion of Cuba and a thorough rethinking of 
hemispheric affairs.
4. UNASUR: Subtle and Not-so-subtle Cooperation 
UNASUR came into being at the First South American Energy Summit, 
held at Margarita, Venezuela in April 2007 by when the commodity 
boom had enjoyed a four year time span and new regional security 
threats were clouding the horizon. In mid-2008, the Andean and 
MERCOSUR countries, plus Chile, Guyana and Suriname, concluded 
the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, also an ambitious project for 
cooperation in the political, economic, financial, social, cultural, energy 
and infrastructure sectors. According to the preamble of the Treaty, 
UNASUR aims to eliminate socio-economic inequality, achieve social 
inclusion and civil-society participation, strengthen democracy and 
reduce asymmetries (Article 3 of the South American Union of Nations 
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Constitutive Treaty lists 21 specific objectives). It was agreed to establish 
the headquarters of the General Secretariat in Quito, and rotate the Pro 
Tempore Presidency among all the Member States for one-year periods, 
with the first year falling on Chile. The first Secretary General, Nestor 
Kirchner, was elected in May 2010 for two year period. Upon his death 
barely 5 months later, agreement was reached to appoint Maria Emma 
Mejia of Colombia and Ali Rodriguez of Venezuela for a one year period 
each. The establishment of a Secretariat and the appointment of the 
Secretary-General with a technical team remain pending. A degree of 
frustration at South American experiences of integration is part of the 
legacy that UNASUR inherits, although its very creation reflects new 
needs. It is telling, however, that the Treaty discards any reference to free 
trade areas, customs unions or convergence of existing trade agreements 
in South America. Such castoff is the more remarkable, considering 
that the idea of a South American free trade area resulting from the 
convergence of the Andean Community and Mercosur had been in the 
offing all during the negotiations of the FTAA (Burges, 2007). With 
this in mind, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso had convened 
a Summit of Presidents of Mercosur and the Andean Community in 
Brasilia in September 2000. Chile, an associated member of Mercosur, 
Guyana and Surinam, members of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, were 
also invited to this summit. Cardoso’s idea was to cordon off the FTAA 
but, instead of emphasizing exclusively on trade issues he proposed a 
wider development agenda (Bizzozero, 2003, 132). By doing so, Cardoso 
intended opposing a home grown South American agenda to the US led 
FTAA agenda which could thrive from investments in infrastructure, 
telecommunications and border development. The issue that gained 
acceptance, thanks to the drive of the large business conglomerates 
was infrastructure. Thus the Initiative for Integration of the Regional 
Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) was conceived as an extended 
network of technical bodies that in practice came under the technical 
support and leadership of the IDB for a period of 10 years. Given the 
interest of business, IIRSA was able to deliver a large portfolio of projects 
to be implemented over the decade distributed in 8 geographic axes of 
integration, most of them in the area of transport with few projects in 
the area of energy and practically nothing in telecoms.
After an early smooth ride, resistance to IIRSA emerged from a 
number of quarters. Not surprisingly Venezuela declined to participate 
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explicitly opposing IDB governance, the IIRSA goal of developing 
export-corridors and the strict financial criteria for selection of projects 
instead of the socially based criteria of the ALBA grannacionales. When 
Lula came to power he also wanted to make his mark and changed 
course, seeking to make the process more aligned with Brazilian 
business rather than technocratically led by the IDB. But, probably 
the main resistance came from social movements which were vocal 
critiques of IIRSA´s neglect of environmental regulation, absence 
of participatory mechanisms, and the negative effects that some 
emblematic IIRSA projects- like the Paraná-Paraguay waterway and 
the Madeira River dam- were causing to indigenous communities. 
By 2008 a new consensus emerged, stating that infrastructure was 
still a priority, that IIRSA had been a good starting point but needed 
radical reform. For governments to take the driver´s seat the contract 
with the IDB was left to expire and, instead, IIRSA was subsumed 
within the Panning Council of the nascent UNASUR. The Planning 
Council (COSIPLAN) soon had to create mechanisms and specific 
methodologies for environmental and participatory. But, probably 
the most important partnership is today with the Brazilian Bank of 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES) which has become in the 
last 7 years a fundamental financer of regional infrastructure projects 
for the expansion of Brazilian companies abroad.
Brazil, as the continent’s newfound economic powerhouse, is the locus 
of much of UNASUR’s momentum. There are also pressing material 
interests at stake for all the countries involved. Several countries hold 
the deep-rooted concern the preeminent security threat may come 
from competition for natural resources or protection of resources 
in the interest of global climate change (in Battaglino, 2012) These 
concerns loom large in Brazil while in Venezuela it is the fear of a US 
military intervention. 
The 2007 Summit took account of the need to design a state-led 
strategy for energy integration. While energy integration still remains 
in the books as an act of faith there is more progress on the promotion 
of military cooperation, confidence and security building measures. 
The Colombian military incursion into Ecuadorian territory in March 
2008; the deployment of troops and equipment in Colombian bases 
and the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet increased tensions in the 
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Andean region. Altogether the events raised serious concerns about 
the growing presence of the US Southern Command and heightened 
military expansion at a level that the region had not experienced since 
the Second World War (Battaglino, 2012). 
The decision to launch the South American Defense Council (SDC) 
was adopted in Costa do Sauipe, Brazil during a special UNASUR 
summit in December 2008. The concern over the destabilizing 
effect of a spiral of militarization and heightened interstate tensions 
prompted Brazil to try and organize a collective response. The window 
of opportunity was the Colombian-Ecuadorian crisis in 2008 at which 
point Lula announced the proposal for the establishment of the CDS. 
Surprisingly the CDS found wide acceptance from inception. Only 
Peru and Colombia held off for a time and only later joined. The 
widespread acceptance of the CDS was not just evidence of Brazil´s 
claim to leadership not allowing Chavez to occupy centre stage by 
himself, but also a demonstration of the Council´s appeal to broader 
regional concerns. The SDC is neither a military alliance nor a defense 
organization. It aims to ensure a zone of peace free of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction; creating an independent 
identity for the region in defense matters; and reinforcing regional 
cooperation for the sovereign control of natural resources. It picked 
up steam first when the Colombian military bombed a FARC camp in 
Ecuador`s territory in 2008, the subsequent border dispute between 
Venezuela and Colombia. 
The Council is the first regional institution specializing in defense 
issues in South American history. It includes the implementation of 
measures that could limit extra-regional influence by virtue of providing 
self-organization of defense and building autonomous capacities for 
projecting security and peace. The Declaration of Santiago de Chile, 
in March 2009, states that the Council is a forum for consultation, 
cooperation and coordination on defense. The Council will cover 
defense policy; military cooperation, humanitarian actions and peace 
operations; industry and technology, and education and training. The 
latter led to the creation of a think tank, the South American Centre 
for Strategic Defense Studies to create a regional military doctrine 
and develop common mechanisms for transparency in defense policy 
and spending. Jointly these initiatives seek to "increase cooperation in 
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defense, promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts and coordinate 
the external defense of nations”.10 The objectives of the Council come 
under three main headings:
•	 Consolidation	of	South	America	as	a	peace	zone.	This	refers	to	the	
need to reduce tensions in an environment of growing tensions, 
especially in the Andean region. The council contemplates different 
policies for the prevention of interstate conflicts and for security 
crisis management. 
•	 Articulation	of	an	understanding	on	South	American	defence.	
This seeks to establish a common ground from which to increase 
cooperation in view of disparate national defense policies. Such 
an understanding is meant to lay the ground to increase regional 
autonomy vis-à-vis wider hemispheric institutions such as the 
Organization of American States (OAS).
•	 Generation	of	a	consensus	in	order	to	strengthen	regional	defence	
cooperation. This implies cooperation for the development of a 
regional defense industry which in the long term can help to reduce 
the dependence from external suppliers of weapons and technolo-
gy. The 2012 Action Plan, for one, endorsed feasibility studies for 
a South American built basic training aircraft, led by Argentina; 
an unmanned aerial vehicle led by Brazil; the armoured vehicles 
“Gaucho” and “Guaraní”; and further cooperation for the future 
Brazilian Embraer C-390 military transport aircraft.
Altogether these represent important developments and reflect well the 
ability of countries to cooperate in their long term interests, despite 
the disruptive short term pressures they face. It would be foolhardy, 
however, to conclude that little remains to be achieved. Progress 
must still be made to increase trust and reduce uncertainty about 
each other´s military capabilities and intentions and to eventually 
replace visions of competition and rivalry. The dynamics of political 
coordination developed within the framework of both UNASUR 
and the CSD have been fundamental in the resolution of various 
conflicts and crises. Political coordination includes urgent summons 
to presidential meetings for confronting crises and rapid deployment 
mechanisms so as not to fall foul of national constraints. This rapid 
deployment reaction came to the fore forcefully on the occasion of the 
agreement signed in August 2009 between Colombia and the United 
Reshaping Regionalism and Regional Cooperation in South America
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 3
9
128
States to allow the latter to establish military bases on Colombian soil. 
South American Presidents, defense, and foreign relations ministers, 
quickly canceled prior commitments and within days organized 
two consecutive meetings. The first, in Argentina included all the 
UNASUR presidents, the second in Ecuador, called the defense and 
foreign affairs ministers. This dynamic contributed not only to the 
de-escalation of the crisis, but also to the establishment of a precedent 
of consultation, discussion and negotiation. UNASUR and CSD 
intervention, specifically in the US-Colombia crisis, was critical for 
the release of the secret agreement between Colombia and the US. 
Neighboring nations were concerned that Colombian bases would be 
used as a platform for increasing US military control over the region. 
Colombia noted that the agreement was limited to its own territory and 
that it defends of the principles of nonintervention and the territorial 
integrity of each State.
Since the conduct of free and fair elections is an essential mechanism 
by which the roots of democracy can be strengthened in the region, 
an Electoral Council of UNASUR was created in 2011 to observe 
elections in member countries and report abuses. The Council sent 
its first observation mission to Guyana to oversee its November 2011 
elections. In 2012 UNASUR was invited to to monitor the October 7 
2012 presidential elections in Venezuela. To guard against repeated 
assaults on democracy, UNASUR has devised a rapid response 
mechanism it has deployed on a number of occasions to prevent non-
democratic attempts at overthrowing democracy such as during the 
Bolivian crisis of August 2008, the Honduran coup in June 2009 and 
the and then in 2010 on the occasion of a police mutiny in Ecuador 
that held President Correa hostage. UNASUR then convened an 
emergency meeting in Argentina and adopted a democracy clause 
to the Constitutive Treaty, which affirmed the union’s commitment 
for the preservation of democratic institutions and the rule of law. 
Despite these elements of a safety net a so-called parliamentary coup 
was hatched in Paraguay in June 2012,when the National Congress 
replaced the democratically elected President, Fernando Lugo with 
Federico Franco. Reacting strongly to this development, UNASUR 
immediately suspended Paraguay’s membership and clarified that 
suspension would not be revoked until constitutional order and 
the rule of law are restored in Paraguay. Member states like Brazil, 
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Argentina and Uruguay also withdrew their ambassadors from 
Paraguay. Further, Ecuador suggested the closing of borders while 
Venezuela stopped oil supplies to Paraguay. However, economic 
sanctions were not imposed because of opposition from Argentina 
on humanitarian grounds.
All told, UNASUR´s greatest potential lies in becoming a geo-economic 
union that can deliver a number of public goods, protection of 
democracy, physical infrastructure and collective security. Ideologically 
UNASUR is a versatile and even contradictory project embracing 
different discourses from different members. In contrast to ALBA, it 
is less dependent on the towering presence of a unique leader or record 
high oil revenues. In UNASUR there is no one political, ideological 
identity although there is a new ideological space in terms of building 
a region in a post hegemonic balance of power. Indeed, political 
differences within the region must not be used systematically to gauge 
the degree of strength or cohesiveness of UNASUR. On the contrary, 
diverse array of political persuasions allows it not be perceived as radical, 
dangerous, or irrelevant. A processes of regional socialization helps to 
transform social and political perceptions by creating a common 
language on the provision of public goods and by identifying those 
elements that are crucial for building a non-conflictive vision. through 
regular interactions and subtle forms of mutual influence (Barnett, 
and Finnemore, 1999). In the case of South America, a growing body 
of literature is bringing to the fore the growing importance of low 
politics, low intensity technical issues such as health, infrastructure, 
natural resources, (Palestini, 2012; Riggirozzi, 2012a; Riggirozzi and 
Tussie, 2012; Sanahuja, 2011). Dominant realist perspectives of 
international organizations focus on binding commitments as the 
litmus test of the utility they provide. Organizations that do not fit 
into the mold of binding mandates and sanctions tended to be looked 
down. The significance of subtler forms of activities, including norm-
construction, influence, persuasion and socialization are dismissed. Yet 
other approaches now more common, such as constructivism focus on 
ideas, discourses and norms contain newer theoretical tools to analyse 
how regional institutions create cooperation as a central mission. The 
consolidation of regional institutions depends therefore on members’ 
ability to strike a balance between political preferences which may not 
coincide and interests which require cooperation. 
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Conclusions 
In a context where Washington is aloof, astray and caring for the 
strategic order in other quarters of the world, the opportunity to 
recapture the region for regional agendas has not been lost. The 
vacuum created by Washington’s detachment also offers new 
opportunities for a fresh look at the increasingly rich and ambivalent 
relationships spanning the continent. The process has gone through 
phases of energetic expansion, of mere trend-following, controlled 
stalemate, disaggregation and reconfiguration as a result of the ups 
and downs of policies and changing conditions. These factors led to 
a leadership competition not only in terms of goals but also of the 
policies included and geographical reach. The analysis of competing 
projects consequently raises a number of interesting questions 
about the relationship between the erstwhile US ambition to lead a 
continent-wide project and the reactions to it. Of course, they are all 
fraught with tensions, pressures and rivalries. Taken together these 
constructions lead from the question of desirability to that of political 
sustainability. The extent to which these initiatives can consolidate 
centripetal resilient projects is still to be seen. Nevertheless, they need 
to be taken as part of valid transformative arrangements shaping new 
spaces for thinking and negotiating alternative models for political 
and social cooperation. Even if the region remains as ongoing project 
in ever changing shapes, it is a fundamental pillars national politics as 
contested and contesting results of given power relations. 
While the ALBA process in a post Bolivarian phase faces hurdle after 
hurdle at the moment of writing, and the Pacific Alliance spreads its 
wings long and far, the quieter forms of cooperation under UNASUR 
may well march on less stridently. Regular summits are certainly part 
of a wider phenomenon, not a prerogative of UNASUR. As such they 
also tend to lose momentum, especially in competition with others 
springing up and taking up new directions. UNASUR may not cringe 
but may plateau once Lula and Chavez as leading trailblazers no longer 
drive the agenda- with their respective styles and respective ideas, 
in competition and cooperation but together ensuring followership 
and providing the necessary muscle and direction to the process. 
Will present leaders agree to continue in those footsteps? How much 
counterhegemony will they collectively tolerate and sustain? The 
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outcome of the crisis in Venezuela may soon give us pointers. The 
decision to send a delegation of foreign ministers to Venezuela places 
the ball firmly in UNASUR’s court for a multilateral approach. But 
the delegation led by the foreign ministers of Brazil, Colombia and 
Ecuador does not yet seem to have been able to move the agenda 
for convening the government and the opposition for face-to-face 
negotiations, either by widening the existing dialogue or by creating 
a new forum in which such conversations can take place. Addressing 
the Venezuelan crisis in UNASUR may be difficult but it holds the 
incentive of putting a lid on the pressure from outsiders which are only 
likely to intensify the longer the violence continues. While President 
Maduro pushed for the crisis to be addressed by UNASUR precisely so 
as to avoid such meddling, for UNASUR to be seen as failing to end 
the violence in Venezuela would lead to a loss of credibility.
NOTES
1. The European firms then proposed that the countries in the region 
should adopt the EU Energy Charter, but it was rejected by South 
American countries, mostly because it would removes the dispute 
settlement process from the region itself. 
2. Argentina and Chile, for example, share the largest worldwide binatio-
nal open pit mining project of gold, silver, copper and other minerals 
in the Pascua Lama site in Andes mountains. Canada based Barrick 
Gold, the world's largest gold mining company, is developing the 
project. 
3. Argentina already has the world’s largest fleet of natural gas cars, Brazil 
the second largest. 
4. http://www.cptech.org/ip/ftaa/FTAAAlternativas2003S.pdf, visited 22 
March 2013
5. http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/alba-da-bienvenida-al-
ecuador-354922.html, visited 22 March, 2013
6. Antonio de la Cruz, http://www.lapatilla.com/site/2013/05/23/antonio-
de-la-cruz-la-debacle-de-pdvsa/ Accessed 18 April, 2014.
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7. ALBA, “Petrocaribe y el combustible integrador”, “Petrocaribe is an 
energy cooperation agreement proposed by the Bolivarian Government 
of Venezuela, in order to address the issues regarding asymmetrical 
access to energy resources, through a new favorable exchange plan, 
equitable and fair to the Caribbean countries, the majority of them 
without state control over the supply of these resources.” http://www.
alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&
sid=3190, visited 2013-03-24 
8. Ibid.
9. http://www.noticiasdel-litoral.com/?p=10450, accessed 18 April 2014
10. Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano, Plan de Acción 2009-2010, en 
http://www.cdsunasur.org/es/plan-de-accion/politicas-de-defensa
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AbstrAct 
Reshaping Regionalism and Regional Cooperation  
in South America
This article revises the reshaping of regional cooperation in South 
America. In the first section I bring to the fore the changed global 
scenario that has exponentially amplified the room to manoeuvre and 
allowed distancing from the Washington Consensus. In the second 
section I describe the variety of initiatives that cut across the region. In 
the subsequent sections I analyse and contrast the ALBA initiative and 
the Union of South American Nations. Finally some conclusions are 
offered. By looking at a set of new foundational ideas and institutions, 
from new continental redefinitions under UNASUR and ALBA to re-
territorialized management of natural resources, defence and currency 
and payments arrangements, I ask how these steps are reshaping 
regional cooperation and what they mean for the way we understand 
regionalism as expanding away from erstwhile trade integration.
resumen 
Reconfiguración del regionalismo y  
la cooperación regional en América del Sur
Este artículo analiza la reconfiguración de la cooperación regional 
en América del Sur. En la primera sección se pone en evidencia un 
escenario mundial cambiado que ha incrementado exponencialmente 
el espacio para maniobrar y ha permitido un distanciamiento del 
Consenso de Washington. En la segunda sección se describen las 
diversas iniciativas que atraviesan la región. En las secciones siguientes, 
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se hace un estudio y comparación de las iniciativas ALBA y UNASUR. 
Finalmente, se presentan algunas conclusiones. Mediante el análisis 
de una serie de nuevas ideas e instituciones fundacionales, que van 
desde nuevas redefiniciones continentales como UNASUR y ALBA 
hasta la gestión territorial de recursos naturales, defensa y acuerdos 
sobre divisas y pagos, la autora pregunta de qué manera estas iniciativas 
están reconfigurando la cooperación regional y cuál es su significado 
en relación con nuestro entendimiento del regionalismo como una 
expansión más allá de la antigua integración comercial.
summArio 
Reconfiguração do regionalismo e a cooperação regional  
na América do Sul
Este artigo analisa a reconfiguração da cooperação regional na América 
do Sul. Na primeira seção, põe-se em relevância um cenário mundial 
transformado que fez crescer exponencialmente o espaço para ma-
nobras e permitiu um distanciamento do Consenso de Washington. 
Na segunda seção são descritas as diversas iniciativas presentes na 
região. Nas seções seguintes, faz-se um estudo comparativo das ações 
da ALBA e da Unasul. Finalmente, algumas conclusões são apresen-
tadas. Mediante a análise de uma série de novas ideias e instituições 
fundacionais, que vão desde redefinições continentais como a Unasul 
e a ALBA até a gestão territorial de recursos naturais, defesa e acordos 
sobre divisas e pagamentos, a autora pergunta de que maneira estas 
iniciativas estão reconfigurando a cooperação regional e qual é seu 
significado em relação ao nosso entendimento do regionalismo como 
uma expansão que vai além da antiga integração comercial.
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